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Renewable Energy Certificates (hereinafter "REC"), traded 
to satisfy the Renewables Portfolio Standard (hereinafter 
"RPS") annual procurement targets, should remain bundled 
with the underlying energy, to the extent practicable, for the 
purpose of protecting ratepayers, local environment, and dis-
advantaged communities often subjected to environmental m-
justice. l 
1 The primary defmition of the term "bundled," as it relates to the electric indus-
try, can be found in the following context: "Bundled utility service (electric): A means of 
operation whereby energy, transmission, and distribution services, as well as ancillary 
and retail services, are provided by one entity." See Energy Information Administra-
tion, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary_b.htm(lastvisited Jan 20,2004). 
Another definition of the term "bundled," closer to the usage in this Comment, 
is related to tradable commodities: "Emissions trading makes it possible to 'bundle' 
emission compliance with either raw materials or finished products, enabling firms to 
differentiate their products in terms of price, public perception or both. Emission com-
pliance can move up or down the supply chain, as firms attempt to divest liability to, or 
remove liability from, suppliers or consumers of their products. In this manner, firms 
might sell 'greenhouse neutral' products to enhance their competitive position. 
Bundling has already been demonstrated in other commodity and emission trading 
markets. For example, in the US sulphur dioxide market, high sulphur coal producers 
routinely bundle their coal with sulphur dioxide emission allowances to secure safes. 
This enables those producers to remain price-competitive with low sulphur alterna-
tives, and provide price certainty to their clients." See Cantor Fitzgerald in association 
with PriceWaterHouse Coopers, The Global Hub for Carbon Commerce available at 
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Theoretically, the "renewable" attribute of renewable en-
ergy can be separated from the underlying energy and then 
sold in the form of Renewable Energy Credits, separately from 
the underlying physical electricity! Such trading is in exis-
tence nationally, though not necessarily associated with RPS 
procurement. 3 A dispute exists concerning separating or un-
bundling the renewable attribute from its underlying energy. 
It is imperative to examine the multitude of implications that 
unbundling would have for California ratepayers and the Cali-
fornia environment before setting a REC trading program into 
motion.' The California Public Utilities Commission (hereinaf-
ter "CPUC") is appropriately proceeding with caution in estab-
lishing a REC trading program, as there are many issues that 
must be resolved prior to launching the program, including the 
CPUC's authority to establish such a trading program! REC 
trading, although not part of the RPS program as envisioned 
The meaning of "bundling," as referred to in this Comment, however is slightly differ-
ent. Here "bundling" simply means that the Renewable Energy Credit, or the renew-
able attribute of the underlying energy, travels with the energy, Le., it does not get 
separated or "unbundled" and then separately traded. 
2 According to Dr. Jan Hamrin of the Center for Resource Solutions, the differ-
ence between Renewable Energy Certificates and Credits is that Credits are actually 
traded, while Certificates are not. ABA Teleconference Everything You Wanted to Know 
about RECs, November 18, 2004, San Francisco 
3 See Green-e Renewable Electricity Certification Program, available at 
http://www.green-e.org/(lastvisitedFeb4.2005).This Comment discusses the impor-
tance of imposing certain qualitative and quantitative restrictions on RECs that may 
be traded within the RPS framework in the future. See infra, pp. 12-18 for more infor-
mation on SB1078, SB1478,SB107, and the RPS program. 
4 The creation of a REC trading program is but a segment of the following pro-
ceeding, in which all RPS issues are consolidated before the CPUC. See Order Institut-
ing Rulemaking to Implement the California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program, 
Rulemaking 04-04-026, (California Public Utilities Commission Apr. 22, 2004), avail-
able athttp://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIFINAL_DECISION/36206.htm. (last vis-
ited Feb 19, 2005). See also Table of documents filed in R0404026 to date, available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/proceedingsIR0404026_doc.htm (last visited Feb 19, 2005). See 
also Opinion Clarifying Participation of Renewable Distributed Generation in the Re-
newable Portfolio Standards Program (Draft Decision of ALJ Allen, Mailed Mar 7, 
2005), available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/COMMENT_DECISION/44308.htm (last visited 
Apr 21, 2005). 
5 See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the California, Renewables 
Portfolio Standard Program, Rulemaking 04-04-026, , Assigned Commissioner's Ruling 
and Scoping Memo Establishing Schedule for Phase Two of the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard Proceeding, at 5 (California Public Utilities Commission Dec. 16, 2004) 
available at http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIRULINGS/42320.htm (last visited 
Jan 20, 2005) 
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by Senate Bill 1078 in 2002, may become so if newly introduced 
Senate Bill 107 becomes law." RPS is a hybrid market-based 
regulatory mechanism aiming to create a minimum market for 
renewable energy resources by requiring energy retailers to 
purchase electricity generated by eligible renewable resources 
as a specified percentage of total kilowatt hours sold to retail 
end-use customers each calendar year: 
The proposition that the renewable attributes, or RECs, 
should remain bundled <travel with the energy) unfortunately 
stands at odds with the goals of renewable generation project 
developers, who seek to create two separate commodities that 
can then be sold for a combined higher price.s 
Can the views of the renewable generation project develop-
ers be reconciled with environmental justice in such a way as to 
make the REC trading system work to everyone's advantage? 
Both groups want to improve the quality of the environment, 
but one group also needs to make a profit in order to make the 
effort viable. Does the need to make a profit stand at odds 
with the interests of the California environment, environ-
mental justice, and empowering poor and minority groups? 
Not necessarily so, and this paper will shed light on some ave-
nues for cooperation between the various interest groups." 
While a significant portion of the solution will undoubtedly 
be resolved from a market-based vantage point, some regula-
tory inputs shall remain necessary as a safety net for potential 
market failures. The reason for this is that while market solu-
tions tend to be creative, it is very doubtful that markets alone, 
without the regulatory backup mechanism, will adequately 
protect multiple interests. It is particularly doubtful whether 
the market alone is best suited to handle issues of environ-
mental justice.lO A potential option in bridging the existing gap 
in approaches to the problem may consist of setting quotas on 
• See infra, pp.12-18 for more information on SBI078, SBI478,SB107, and the 
RPSprogram 
7Id. 
B See infra, pp. 20-29 
9 See, e.g., American Leaders Declaration of Energy Independence, available at 
http://www.honorearth.org/initiatives/energy/independenceday/declaration.html, (last 
visited May 1, 2005) (an example of how some Native Americans in the Great Plains 
states perceive wind energy, as the clean, renewable solution to multiple problems) 
10 For a comprehensive survey of major economic incentives and market-based 
environmental programs implemented by governments, see Stephen M. Johnson, Eco-
nomics, Equity, and the Environment, Environmental Law Institute (2004). 
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how many unbundled RECs may be used toward RPS compli-
ance. ll 
This comment discusses the current debate over whether 
or not to unbundle RECs and concludes that no regulatory or 
legislative decision can be made without careful consideration 
of the potential adverse environmental impacts of unbundling 
upon disadvantaged communities. Part I explains the concept 
of Distributed Generation, its history and its importance for 
the electrical utility industry, paying particular attention to 
renewable Distributed Generation. Next, it describes the role of 
the CPUC in the argument regarding REC bundling. This part 
also examines legislative efforts undertaken to deal with the 
evolving relationship between renewable energy generators, 
Distributed Generators and the Investor Owned Utilities (here-
inafter "IOU"). Part I concludes with an exploration of the in-
terplay between regulatory and market approaches to solving 
various problems in California's recent power industry history. 
Part II analyzes the pros and the cons of bundled RECs as they 
relate to REC trading, ratepayers and owners of residential 
photovoltaic systems. Part III first analyzes environmental 
justice issues in the context of unbundling RECs, and then pro-
poses that the California Legislature pass the newly introduced 
Senate Bill 107. 
1. BACKGROUND 
A. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 
"Distributed generation involves the use of small scale 
electric generating technologies installed at, or in close prox-
imity to, the end-user's location. nt. Although DG can be located 
11 See Senate Bill 107, introduced on January 20, 2005, proposed language of 
amendment to Section 399.15 of the California Public Utilities Code, adding Section (g) 
"The commission shall establish rules that authorize the use of renewable energy credits 
to satisfy annual procurement targets. At a minimum, the rules shall do all of the fol-
lowing: ... (3) Limit the quantity of renewable energy credits that can be procured un-
bundled from electricity generation to meet the annual procurement targets of a retail 
seller .... " available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/publbilllsenlsb_0101-
0150/sb_107_biIC20050120_introduced.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 2005). 
12 See Rulemaking 99-10-025, Order Instituting Rulemaking into Distributed 
Generation, at 1 (California Public Utilities Commission, Oct.21, 1999), available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/staticlindustry/electricldistributed+generationldg_decisions.ht 
m (last visited Feb 21,2005). 
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on the premises of small scale commercial enterprises, many 
renewable Distributed Generation systems are owned by indi-
vidual home owners with wind and/or solar systems on their 
rooftops. 13 Distributed Generation (hereinafter, "DG"), along 
with energy storage, and targeted end-use and demand-side 
management technologies, comprises what is commonly re-
ferred to as Distributed Energy Resources (hereinafter 
"DER").14 The CPUC expects "that the use of distributed gen-
eration and DER will grow substantially in the coming years."'5 
There are many advantages to Distributed Generation and 
DER, particularly renewable DG.'6 DER can provide potential 
benefits to the electrical network if employed with sufficient 
care and foresight. 17 Potential benefits include reduced trans-
mission and distribution line losses, avoided commodity costs 
in terms of energy and capacity, enhanced reliability, improved 
stability and power quality, increased responsiveness to load 
growth, national security benefits by reducing dependence on 
the grid, conservation of natural gas (if the DG is renewable, 
not so if the customer simply burns gas in a micro-turbine), and 
avoided utility cost of financing (unless the customer has a 
higher financing cost). 18 From the renewable energy vantage 
13 RECs can be generated both by large commercial renewable energy generators 
(such as wind farms), and by DG (such as solar panels or couple of small wind turbines 
on a homeowner's rooD. This comment addresses the unbundling of RECs overall, but 
focuses on DG due to its particular advantages. Currently no data seem to have been 
compiled on the exact quantity of one versus the other type, though it may be accurate 
to state that number-wise, there are more homeowner-operated renewable Distributed 
Generation systems than commercial ones, while in terms of total generating capacity, 
the commercial installations probably generate much more capacity. Author's exchange 
with the Staff of the National Renewably Energy Laboratory, United States Department 
of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, which maintains the 
Renewable Electric Plant Information System (REPiS), available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/(lastvisited Feb 17,2005) 
,. See Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures and Incen-
tives for Distributed Generation and Distributed Energy Resources, Rulemaking 04-03-
017, at 4. (California Public Utilities Commission, Mar 16, 2004) available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdflFINAL_DECISION/34972.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 
2005) 
15Id. 
16 See http://www.eere.energy.gov/de/pdfs/distenergyJs.pdf (last visited Jan 
21, 2005), http://www.distributed-generation.com/Library I Maine.pdf (last visited Jan 
20, 2005), http://www.undp.org I seedl eap I activities I wea I drafts-frame.html (last 
visited Jan 21, 2005), and CPUC R.04-03-017 
17 See supra, note 14. 
18 See Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures and Incen-
tives for Distributed Generation and Distributed Energy Resources, Assigned Commis-
sioner and Administrative Law Judge's Ruling and Scoping Memo, R.04-03-017, at 4-6. 
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point in general, there is also the promise of increased em-
ployment.!9 
Moreover, there are specific environmental benefits result-
ing from renewable DG: nitrogen oxide and carbon dioxide are 
not produced; water and soil pollution are reduced; and there 
are fewer power-plant siting impacts compared to those oflarge 
central station power plants!O Finally, renewable DG carries 
the promise of promoting environmental equity.2! Often fossil-
fuel burning power plants are disproportionately located in 
poor and minority communities.22 Fossil fuel power plants are 
responsible for emissions of sulfur dioxide and another criteria 
air pollutant, nitrogen oxide, which combine with volatile or-
ganic compounds to create ozone.23 Thus, these communities 
could benefit if renewable DG reached a large enough number 
to allow for the closing of dirty power plants by supplying clean 
and efficient electricity in their stead. It will, in all likelihood, 
take a long time before renewable DG reaches critical mass, 
(California Public Utilities Commission, Aug, 6, 2004) available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIRULINGS/38555.htm.This Order considers the 
methodology for evaluating DG cost effectiveness, as well as the factors that will be 
used in such a methodology. The Energy Division and California Energy Commission 
("CEC") collaboratively conducted a workshop on May 5, 2004 looking at several CEC-
funded research projects aimed at developing ways to quantify these values from the 
perspective of various interests. A number of DG cost-benefit factors for possible inclu-
sion in a cost-benefit methodology has come out of this workshop. 
19 Some put the number at 240,000 jobs that could be created by 2020, if federal 
policies favored renewable sources, while building new coal and gas-fired plants would 
produce only about 80,000 jobs in comparison. See Plan to Junk Oil, Add Jobs: New 
Coalition Pushes Renewables available at 
http://www.apolloalliance.orglapollo_in_the_newslsfchron.cfm, (last visited Oct 3, 
2004). See generally www.Apolloalliance.org. 
20 See supra, note 18, at 4-6. 
21Id. 
22 See Robert D. Bullard, It's Not Just, Pollution available at 
http://www.ourplanet.com/imgversn/ 1221 bullard.html (last visited Jan 21, 2005). See 
Clifford Rechtschaffen, Advancing Environmental Justice Norms, 27 Environs Envtl. L. 
& Pol'y J. 95(2003) p.6. 
23 See EPA National Air Quality and Emission Trends Report 2003 Apendix A, 
Table A-9 available at http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends I aqtrnd03 (last visited Jan 
21,2005). The table shows National Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Estimates for a number 
of years. In year 2000, the last year for which data is shown, of the total for all sources, 
18,201 thousand short tons, 11,389 were emitted by fuel combustion in electric utilities, 
whereof 10,723 were emitted by coal burning plants, 511 by oil, 9 by gas, and 59 by 
internal combustion. In comparison, all of industrial processes, including chemical and 
allied product manufacturing, metals processing, petroleum and related industries, 
solvent utilization, textiles, leather, wood, pulp and paper, agriculture etc. amounted to 
a total of 1,498 thousand short tons. Transportation was only slightly higher, at 1,805 
thousand short tons. 
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even though efforts are under way." There is hope, however. 
Market-oriented entrepreneurs are, and will continue, to capi-
talize on the need to switch to renewable energy resources and 
to decentralize the generation of electricity, making it cheaper 
and more reliable, while creating a healthier environment.25 
Meanwhile, the government must take precautions to include 
environmental justice concerns in the multitude of energy de-
velopment plans, such as the REC trading program, because 
the market tends to ignore the needs of those who cannot vote 
with their dollars. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE CALIFORNIA PuBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION 
The California Public Utilities Commission (hereinafter 
"CPUC") derives its authority from the Constitution of the 
State of California and from the California Legislature.26 It was 
created to regulate privately owned utilities, as well as the 
railroad, rail transit and passenger transportation companies.27 
Its main regulatory responsibilities are rate setting and assur-
ing safe services.28 
Public Utilities Commissions nationwide derive their 
mandates from the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
(hereinafter "PUHCA").29 This Act was passed to "eliminate 
unfair practices and other abuses by electricity and gas holding 
24 See supra, note 14. 
25 The California 2000-2001 crisis has cast many doubts on the contention that 
deregulation would lead to a reduction in electricity prices. See Karina Garbesi, Public 
Interest Impacts of Electricity Deregulation: Lessons from California and the U.S., 
unpublished article submitted to Environment and Planning Commission: Government 
and Policy 9/15/2002. (kgarbesi@Csuhayward.edu) On DG in particular, see Order Insti-
tuting Rulemaking Into Distributed Generation, raises the issue of "Iocational market 
power" in cases where the distributed generation is sited in areas with inadequate grid 
capacity during peak load periods and therefore the price could be raised above com-
petitive market levels for energy or ancillary services. This issue is one of five issues 
that the CPUC defmed as arising in connection with the sale of excess capacity by 
distributed generators. See supra, note 13, at 17. 
26 CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 3 and 5. 
27 See http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/cfaqs/(last visited Feb 4, 2005) 
26 Id. 
29 See CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Amy Abel and Larry Parker, Resources, 
Science, and Industry Division, Electricity: The Road Toward Restructuring available 
at Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, CRS Web, 
http://www.iwar.org.uklnews-archive/crsl23425.pdf (last visited Oct 3, 2004). 
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companies by requiring federal control and regulation of inter-
state public utility holding companies. "30 
Currently, the CPUC is involved in a large undertaking, 
along with the California Energy Commission (hereinafter 
"CEC"), in connection with the development of the RPS pro-
gram and the treatment of RECs under the RPS.31 Part of that 
undertaking is the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter 
"ALJ") Peter Allen's "Ruling Requesting Comments on Partici-
pation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard Program, on which he recently issued a 
draft decision."32 The ruling primarily concerns the question of 
renewable DG REC ownership associated with the energy out-
put from renewable DG facilities subsidized by Investor Owned 
Utilities ratepayers.33 the CPUC wants to know whether the 
ownership of RECs should be public or private and the ration-
ale for it. 34 Most of all, the Commission wants to know how 
RECs associated with those facilities fit into the RPS program.3S 
30 "The Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) and the Federal Power Act 
(FPA) of 1935 ... established a regime of regulating electric utilities that gave specific 
and separate powers to the states and the federal government. A regulatory bargain 
was made between the government and the utilities. In exchange for an exclusive 
franchise service territory, utilities must provide electricity to all users at reasonable, 
regulated rates. State regulatory commissions address intrastate utility activities, 
including wholesale and retail rate-making ... Under the FPA, federal economic regula-
tion addresses wholesale transactions and rates for electric power flowing in interstate 
commerce." Id. 
31 See supra note 4. 
32 See generally http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/published/rulings/39482.htm (last 
visited Jan 23, 2005). See also Opinion Clarifying Participation of Renewable Distrib-
uted Generation in the Renewable Portfolio Standards Program (Draft Decision of ALJ 
Allen, Mailed Mar 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHED/COMMENT_DECISION/44308.htm (last visited 
Apr 21, 2005). 
33 Id. The Commission has not yet issued a decision on this ruling, but may do so 
as this comment goes into print . 
.. Id . 
.. Id. The following questions have been posed to the parties to the proceeding 
by Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "AW") Allen as a framework for their com-
ments: 
1) If a DG facility receives subsidies via CPUC and/or CEC programs, should the 
RECs associated with output from those facilities be considered the property of the 
public (i.e., California ratepayers)? Why or why not? 
2) If the RECs are public property, can such RECs be used in the RPS program? If 
so, how? 
3) If the RECs are not public property, who do they belong to: the DG facility 
owner, the local utility, or someone else? Why? 
8
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The CPUC received numerous comments from various stake-
holders as part of this administrative rulemaking process, upon 
which ALJ Allen based his Draft Decision.36 One of the key is-
sues addressed by most parties to this proceeding is the issue of 
whether RECs ought to be bundled or unbundled from the un-
derlying energy.37 
C. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN TO HANDLE THE 
EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RENEWABLE ENERGY 
GENERATORS, DISTRIBUTED GENERATORS AND THE 
INVESTOR OWNED UTILITIES 
In order to understand how environmental justice may be 
at stake in the proposed REC trading program, it is important 
to review the following legislative efforts. The historical rela-
tionship of the renewable Distributed Generators and Investor 
Owned Utilitiess in relation to RECs can be analyzed via: the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, the California 
Public Utilities Code, Section 2827 net energy metering and co-
energy metering, and Senate Bill 1078, which establishes the 
California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program.38 The cur-
rent debate, on the other hand, can be followed in the context of 
Senate Bill 1478, which was vetoed by Governor Schwarzeneg-
ger on September 24, 2004,39 and Senate Bill 107, which was 
just introduced by Senators Simitian and Perata on January 
4) If the RECs are not public property, what public benefits are CPUC and/or CEC 
subsidies supporting? 
5) Should California consider a system of differential incentives for renewable DG 
facilities, depending on whether the DG owner claims ownership of the associated 
RECs? 
6) What other issues relating to the participation of DG in the PRS program need 
to be addressed immediately? 
36 See Comments of the parties to the proceeding, list of documents available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/proceedings/R0404026.htm (last visited Feb 19, 2005). 
37 [d. 
38 CA PUB UTIL §399.11. 
39 See Governor's Veto Message available at http://leginfo.ca.gov 1 pub 1 03-
041 bill 1 sent sb_1451-15001 sb_1478_vC20040924.html (last visited Feb 19, 2005). 
9
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20, 2005, in an attempt to revive legislation that died with 
Governor Schwarzenegger's veto of Senate Bill 1478.40 
1. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
In the years following the 1973 crisis caused by the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries embargo, the U.S. 
government acknowledged the importance of managing oil con-
sumption and, for the first time in U.S. history, energy effi-
ciency became a burning issue." In 1978, in an attempt to re-
duce U.S. dependence on fossil fuels, particularly imported 
ones, Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act (hereinafter "PURPA").42 PURPA was designed to encour-
age the growth of alternative energy usage and was aimed in 
part at achieving efficient electricity generation and equitable 
rates for consumers. 43 The Act requires that utilities buy power 
from qualifying facilities (hereinafter "QFS")44 at prices equal to 
the utility's avoided cost of purchasing from other sources!· 
40 See SBI07 Legislative Counsel's Digest available at 
http:lneginfo.ca.gov/publbilVsenlsb_Ol0l-0150/sb_l07_bilC20050120_introduced.pdf 
(last visited Feb 4, 2005). 
41 See supra, note 29 . 
.. [d. 
43 [d . 
.. Qualifying Facilities can be either cogenerators or small power producers, as 
defined in section 3( 17) and (18) of the Federal Power Act [16 U.S.C.S. §§ 796( 17) and 
(18)]: 
"qualifying cogeneration facility" means a cogeneration facility which--
(i) the Commission determines, by rule, meets such requirements (including 
requirements respecting minimum size, fuel use, and fuel efficiency) as the Com-
IIlJ.SSlOn may, by rule, prescribe; and 
(ii) is owned by a person not primarily engaged in the generation or sale of 
electric power (other than electric power solely from cogeneration facilities or 
small power production facilities); and 
"qualifying small power production facility" means a small power production facil-
ity--
(i) which the Commission determines, by rule, meets such requirements (in-
cluding requirements respecting fuel use, fuel efficiency, and reliability) as the 
Commission may, by rule, prescribe; and 
(ii) which is owned by a person not primarily engaged in the generation or 
sale of electric power (other than electric power solely from cogeneration facilities 
or small power production facilities) . 
.. See supra, note 29. Qualifying Facilities are exempt under the 1935 Public 
Utility Holding Company Act (hereinafter "PUHCA") and the 1935 Federal Power Act 
(hereinafter "FPA"). "In addition to PURPA, the Fuel Use Act of 1978 (FUA, P.L. 95-
620) helped qualifying facilities (QFs) become established .. Under FUA, utilities were 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss3/9
2005] UNBUNDLE RENEWABLE ENERGY 501 
QFs are not subject to state regulatory oversight and can 
achieve eligibility under PURPA through the use of renewable 
fuels or by meeting minimum cogeneration standards adopted 
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.46 Nonetheless, 
by encouraging smaller power generators, Congress in essence 
stimulated distributed generation, the benefits of which can 
foremost be understood in terms of energy efficiency. One of 
the potential benefits of DG is reduced transmission and distri-
bution line losses, because Distributed Generation systems are 
installed at, or in close proximity to, the end-user's location." 
Thus a significant percentage of energy generation, which 
would otherwise be lost in the form of heat, is instead utilized.'s 
The main achievement ofPURPA, however, was the opening of 
the energy market to non-utilities, which ultimately led to the 
energy market deregulation in the 1990s.49 
not permitted to use natural gas to fuel new generating technology. QFs, which are by 
definition not utilities, were able to take advantage of abundant natural gas as well as 
new generating technology, such as combined-cycle plants that use hot gases from 
combustion turbines to generate additional power. These technologies lowered the 
fmancial threshold for entrance into the electricity generation business as well as 
shortened the lead time for constructing new plants. FUA was repealed in 1987, but by 
this time QFs and small power producers had gained a portion of the total electricity 
supply." [d. at 3. 
46 [d. 
47 Supra, note 14. See also Thomas Casten and Sean Casten, Transforming Elec-
tricity in the US, Cogeneration and On-site Power Production, Volume 2 Issue 6, No-
vember-December 2001, James & James (2001). 
49 See Energy Information Administration / Annual Energy Review 2003 avail-
able at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov / FTPROOT/ multifuel / 038403.pdf (last visited Jan 30, 
2005). For year 2002, out of 3,858 billion kilowatt-hours, 241 were lost in transmission 
and distribution, or unaccounted for, which amounts to 6.24 %. 
49 Kevin Golden, Comment, Senate Bill 1078: The Renewable Portfolio Standard 
- California Asserts its Renewable Energy Leadership, 30 Ecology L.Q. 693, 696 (2003) 
11
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2. California Public Utilities Code, Section 282750 
Section 2827, the "net energy metering and co-energy me-
tering" provision, was added to the California Public Utilities 
Code in 1995 in an effort to "encourage substantial private in-
vestment in renewable energy resources, stimulate in-state 
economic growth, reduce demand for electricity during peak 
consumption periods, help stabilize California's energy supply 
infrastructure, enhance the continued diversification of Cali-
fornia's energy resource mix, and reduce interconnection and 
administrative costs for electricity suppliers."61 
Section 2827(g) attempts to level the playing field for re-
newable Distributed Generators, by prohibiting the retail util-
ity from charging the Net-Metered Renewable Distributed 
Generator (hereinafter "customer-generator") any fees other 
than those associated with the "customer-generator's net kilo-
watt-hour consumption over a 12-month period, without regard 
50 Relevant definitions are provided in Section 2827(b): 
(2) "Eligible customer-generator" means a residential, small commercial customer 
as defined in subdivision (h) of Section 331, commercial, industrial, or agricultural 
customer of an electric service provider, who uses a solar or a wind turbine electri-
cal generating facility, or a hybrid system of both, with a capacity of not more than 
one megawatt that is located on the customer's owned, leased, or rented premises, 
is interconnected and operates in parallel with the electric grid, and is intended 
primarily to offset part or all of the customer's own electrical requirements. 
(3) "Net energy metering" means measuring the difference between the electricity 
supplied through the electric grid and the electricity generated by an eligible cus-
tomer-generator and fed back to the electric grid over a 12-month period as de-
scribed in subdivision (h). Net energy metering shall be accomplished using a sin-
gle meter capable of registering the flow of electricity in two directions. An addi-
tional meter or meters to monitor the flow of electricity in each direction may be 
installed with the consent of the customer-generator, at the expense of the electric 
service provider, and the additional metering shall be used only to provide the in-
formation necessary to accurately bill or credit the customer-generator pursuant 
to subdivision (h), or to collect solar or wind electric generating system perform-
ance information for research purposes. If the existing electrical meter of an eligi-
ble customer-generator is not capable of measuring the flow of electricity in two 
directions, the customer-generator shall be responsible for all expenses involved in 
purchasing and installing a meter that is able to measure electricity flow in two 
directions. If an additional meter or meters are installed, the net energy metering 
calculation shall yield a result identical to that of a single meter. An eligible cus-
tomer-generator who already owns an existing solar or wind turbine electrical 
generating facility, or a hybrid system of both, is eligible to receive net energy me-
tering service in accordance with this section. 
51 CA PUB UTIL § 2827(a) 
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to the customer-generator's choice of electric service provider."52 
Thus the customer-generator is freed from having to pay for 
other rate components, such as transmission, distribution, pub-
lic purpose programs, generation, nuclear decommissioning, 
interconnection charges, standby charges, and minimum 
monthly charges.53 Non-renewable Distributed Generators still 
have to pay for all these components, while receiving credit 
only against the generation rate component.54 
3. Senate Bill 1078 
Senate Bill 1078 (California, 2002) (hereinafter "SB 1078") 
established the California RPS program.55 The RPS is a regula-
tory program that establishes requirements for the procure-
ment of renewable energy and thereby seeks to create a market 
in which sellers can participate.56 The policy guiding this pro-
gram is the creation of many security, economic, and environ-
mental benefits for California. 57 The program requires Investor 
Owned Utilities,58 Electric Service Providers59 and Community 
Choice AggregatorsGO (hereinafter collectively "retail sellers") to 
"purchase a specified minimum percentage of electricity gener-
52 Id. at § 2827(g). 
63 Id. 
54 Id . 
.. SB 1078 § 1,(Ca. 2002) (amending Cal. Pub. Util.Code adding § 387) 
66 Golden, supra note 49, at 699-700. 
07 Id. See also Am. Wind Energy Ass'n, The Renewable Portfolio Standard: How 
It Works and Why It's Needed, available at 
http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheetslRPSHowWhy02.pdf(last visited Feb 19, 2005) . 
.. "A privately-owned electric utility whose stock is publicly traded. It is rate 
regulated and authorized to achieve an allowed rate of return." See Glossary available 
at http://www.eia. doe.gov / glossary 1 glossary j htm (last visited Jan 21, 2005) . 
.. "Non-utility entities providing services as deimed under CPUC Rule 1." See 
Glossary available at 
http://www.pge.com/docs 1 pdfs 1 biz 1 transmission_services 1 contracts_tariffs 1 di_handb 
ookIGlossary.pdf(last visited Jan 21,2005). 
'" See Assembly Bill 117, Migden (Ca. 2002). Electrical restructuring: aggrega-
tion. "(1) Existing law, relating to transactions between electricity suppliers and end-
use customers, authorizes various entities to aggregate electrical loads, and defines an 
"aggregator" as one of those entities that provides power supply services, including 
combining the loads of multiple end-use customers and facilitating the sale and pur-
chase of electrical energy, transmission, and other services on behalf of the end-use 
customers. This bill would authorize customers to aggregate their electrical loads as 
members of their local community with community choice aggregators, as defined ... " 
http://leginfo.ca.gov Ipub/ 01·021 bill / asm / ab_0101· 
0150/ ab_117 _bilC20020924_chaptered.pdfOast visited Feb 19, 2005) 
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ated by eligible renewable resources, as defined, in any given 
year as a specified percentage of total kilowatt hours sold to 
retail end-use customers each calendar year.""· Electricity re-
tailers can achieve RPS compliance by owning a renewable 
electricity generating facility or by purchasing electricity from 
another facility that generates from renewable sources."2 RPS 
is a hybrid program in the sense that it aims to achieve public 
policy goals while staying true to a market-based approach.53 
The policy goals it attempts to achieve are, inter alia, the cor-
rection of market failures, and the sustainability and market-
ability of new technologies.64 Even though some legislative pro-
visions may be contentious, the RPS "contains the fundamental 
commitment necessary for a successful mandate to increase 
renewable energy procurement through long-term purchase 
obligations.""5 Under current law, "utilities must increase their 
total procurement of eligible renewable energy resources by at 
least one percent per year so that twenty percent of their retail 
sales are procured from eligible renewable energy resources by 
December 31, 2017. »66 
4. Senate Bills 1478 and 107 
Senate Bill 1478 (hereinafter USB 1478") was vetoed by 
Governor Schwarzenegger on September 24, 2004, after pass-
ing both the Senate and the Assembly.s7 This bill sought to in-
crease the amount of electricity generated from renewable re-
sources per year to "at least twenty percent of the total electric-
ity sold to retail customers in California per year by the year 
2010" from the current "at least seventeen percent of the total 
electricity generated for consumption in California per year by 
6. SB 1078 § 1, (Ca. 2002) adding Article 16 (commencing with Section 399.11) to 
Chapter 2.3 of Part 1 of Division 1 of, the Cal. Pub. Util. Code), See Legislative Coun-
sel's Digest (1). Also, see California Energy Commission, Draft Staff White Paper "Ac-
celerated Renewable Energy Development" prepared in support of the 2004 Integrated 
Energy Policy Report Update Proceeding (03-IEPR-01), July 30, 2004, 100-04-003D. 
62 Golden, supra note 49, at 700. 
63 Id. 
o. Id . 
.. Id. at 712 . 
.. CA PUB UTIL § 399.15 (b)(1), (Ca 2004); See also 
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIFINAL_DECISION/36206.htm#P32_487 
67 See supra, note 39. 
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2006.''"8 It also sought to implement guidance necessary for 
preventing double-counting in measuring RECs.69 
SB1478 addressed the issue of REC ownership in contrac-
tual relationships, so that "[a] contract for the purchase of elec-
tricity generated by an eligible renewable energy resource shall 
include the renewable energy credits associated with all elec-
tricity generation specified under the contract. rno Furthermore, 
the bill was drafted to limit the "quantity of renewable energy 
credits that can be procured unbundled from electricity genera-
tion to meet the annual procurement targets of a retail seller."71 
SB 1478 hoped to improve the State's transmission system 
by fast-tracking the approval process in order to facilitate the 
development or delivery of renewable generation.72 It, however, 
allowed for additional flexibility in RPS compliance by attempt-
ing to establish rules authorizing "the use of renewable energy 
credits to satisfy annual procurement targets.rna 
Senate Bill 107 (hereinafter "SB107") seeks to revive SB 
1478. It provides a much-needed definition for a "renewable 
energy credit" and specifies the REC certification process, 
which is to be carried out by the Energy Commission. 7' REC is 
defined as "a certificate of proof, issued through the accounting 
system established by the Energy Commission pursuant to Sec-
tion 399.13, that one unit of electricity was generated by an 
eligible renewable energy resource and delivered to a retail 
seller, the Independent System Operator, or a local publicly 
owned utility subject to the requirements of subdivision (e) of 
Section 399.13.'''" 
68 SB 1478 Section 1. amending CA PUB RES § 25740, (Ca 2004) available at 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/billlsen/sb_1451-
1500/sb_1478_bill_20040827 _enrolled. pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) 
69 Id. E.g. double counting is a source of major contention between the utilities 
and the renewable DG owners. While the utilities argue that their ratepayers would 
have to pay twice for RECs if they were awarded to DG owners, DG owners contend 
that by removing much of their demand from the grid, they are, on the other hand, 
decreasing the overall number of KWh of retail sales, used as the basis for determining 
the RPS procurement target for retail sellers. See infra, note 112. 
70 SB 1478 amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.14 (a)(2)(E), (Ca 2004) available at 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/billlsen/sb_1451-
1500/sb_1478_bilC2004082Lenrolled.pdf (last visited May 4, 2005). 
71 Id. at §399.14(a)(2)(D)(v). 
72 Id. at §399.11(e) 
73 SB 1478 amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.14 (a)(2)(D), (Ca. 2004) 
7. SB 107 adding CA PUB UTIL § 387(e), (Ca. 2005) 
75Id. 
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SB107 does not "fail to recognize California's commitment 
and reliance on an electricity market that includes the entire 
western region of the country. me In contrast, it provides that 
the Energy Commission "shall consult with other states in the 
Western Electricity Coordinating Council transmission system 
to develop consistent mechanisms and protocols for verifying 
renewable energy credits and to prevent double counting of the 
electricity generated from any eligible renewable energy re-
source" in establishing a REC tracking and verification sys-
tem.77 
SB 107 does impose some restrictions on out-of-state elec-
tric generating facilities, however.78 For example, it limits eli-
gibility to facilities located within the Western Electricity Co-
ordinating Council transmission system that commence initial 
operations after January 1,2005, under a guaranteed contract 
with a retail seller and which can demonstrate delivery of the 
contracted amount.7• SB 107 allows for flexibility in RPS com-
pliance rules for out-of-state REC imports where the underly-
ing energy is sold into the California market and "no feasible or 
cost-effective transmission facilities exist to deliver the electric-
ity to the electrical corporation's service territory.""o 
SB 107 refines the definition of "supplemental energy 
payments" to cover only reasonable costs of eligible renewable 
energy resources, and it reiterates that "[t]he commission may 
not award supplemental energy payments for the sale or pur-
chase of renewable energy credits."81 It locks in the supplemen-
tal energy payment price at the "applicable market price refer-
ent at the time of initial contracting."82 Supplemental energy 
payments are structured as payments made by the California 
Energy Commission to generators to cover the costs of long-
term contracts with retail sellers that exceed the applicable 
76 See supra, note 39. 
77 SB 107 adding CA PUB UTIL § 399.13 (c) 
78 SB 107 amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.16 
79 [d. This provision is to prevent reallocation of payment for RECs from Western 
States, that do not have RPS programs, to California ratepayers. Instead of such a 
reallocation of payment, the program seeks to create real incremental difference in the 
number of renewable energy providers. 
60 SB 107 amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.14 (a)(2)(C) by adding(ii), (Ca 2004) 
81 SBI07 amending CA PUB RES § 25743 (b)(1), (Ca. 2005) 
82 SB107 amending CA PUB RES § 25743 (b)(1) by adding (C), (Ca. 2005) 
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market price referent established by the CPUC."" Moreover, SB 
107 further clarifies the requirement of demonstrability of "de-
livery of the electricity under contract to the retail seller serv-
ing end-use customers subject to the renewable energy public 
goods charge .... • In terms of compliance with RPS, SB107 clari-
fies the commission's powers to enforce penalties, i.e., that the 
CPUC is expected to enforce comparable penalties against 
Electric Service Providers and Community Choice Aggrega-
tors."s 
5. Summary of Legislative Efforts 
PURPA "cracked open the market to non-utility power 
producers."86 It established an obligation for regulated utilities 
to purchase the output of unregulated Qualifying Facilities at 
the "avoided cost" that would otherwise be paid for energy in 
the market, which was ultimately also its critical limitation, 
particularly in the face of subsequent deregulation.B7 Public 
Utilities Code Section 2827, through its net-metering program, 
encourages renewable distributed generation by cutting all 
charges associated with interconnection to the utilities, except 
for the net consumption of electricity from the grid. BB And fi-
nally, SB 1078 created the RPS program, which establishes a 
requirement for all Investor Owned Utilities, Electric Service 
Providers and Community Choice Aggregators to increase their 
procurement of renewable sources by at least one percent of 
retail sales per year until reaching 20 percent no later than 
2017.B9 Although it can be achieved by various means, for some 
retailers, the potential of buying renewable energy credits may 
83 See puc Sets Stage for Renewable Energy Needs, June 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDINEWS_RELEASE/37327.htm (last visited Apr 
21,2005) 
.. SB107 amending CA PUB RES § 25743 (b)(1) by adding (D), (Ca. 2005)This 
provision is to protect the California environment and to stabilize markets. 
56 SBI07 amending 399.14(d), (Ca. 2005) 
86 Golden, supra note 49,at 696. 
87 [d. 
88 See CA PUB UTIL § 2827(g) 
89 See, CA PUB UTIL §§ 399.11-399.16. SB 1078, chaptered on September 12, 
2002; requires the Commission to establish a program whereby the utilities must pur-
chase a specified minimum percentage of electricity generated by renewable energy 
resources. The utilities must increase their total procurement of eligible renewable 
energy resources by at least one percent per year so that twenty percent of their retail 
sales are procured from eligible renewable energy resources by December 31, 2017. 
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be more appealing than actually generating that energy, due to 
limitations imposed by the lack of locally available renewable 
energy resources and non-feasible transmission from remote 
areas. SB107 recognizes this problem and allows utilities in 
such a position to obtain unbundled RECs through long-term 
purchase agreements.90 
Requiring caps on how many RECs can be imported from 
out-of-state and how many RECs can be unbundled should not 
be understood as a roadblock to renewable energy generation. 
It merely serves as a guarantee for the California environment. 
To a certain extent, it also seeks to protect minority and low-
income communities. A system allowing unchecked unbun-
dling of the renewable attribute from the underlying energy in 
the name of market efficiency could potentially come at the ex-
pense of the Californian environment and her most vulnerable 
communities. Such trading, however, has not yet been intro-
duced into the California regulated market and existing Cali-
fornia law does not provide for it.91 
D. BALANCING REGULATIONS WITH MARKET INCENTIVES 
Part of the discussion on how to achieve the RPS goals in-
volves the debate of whether command-and-control regulation 
or market incentives are a better approach. One of the effects 
of market manipulations during the initial stages of deregula-
tion in California is that briefly the balance had shifted in favor 
of regulations.9' Even though market mechanisms have stead-
ily gained momentum from the 1990s onward, after the energy 
crisis they were not trusted to do the job alone. Nonetheless, 
market incentives continue to dominate the discourse. 93 While 
90 SB107, amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.14 (a)(2)(C)(ii) Flexible rules for com-
pliance (Ca, 2005). 
91 There is a parallel trading scheme taking place in the unregulated market, 
nationwide. There are firms that certify and track green energy products, such as the 
Center for Resource Solutions. http://www.green-e.org/ last visited Feb 4, 2005). See 
supra, note 3. 
92 See Garbesi, supra note 25. 
93 "It is very likely that in the current Congress it will be very difficult to pass 
any environmental bill skewed in favor of regulatory methods rather than market 
incentives". Roger S. Ballentine, Esq., President of Green Strategies, Inc., ABA Tele-
conference November 18, 2004. See Jim Rossi: The Common Law Duty to Serve and 
Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 
51 Vand. L. Rev. 1233 (1998). Professor Rossi is a known authority on energy law, who 
espouses primarily market solutions. See his homepage at Florida State College of Law 
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offering many incentives and creative solutions for the indus-
try, alone they fail to provide assurances against abuse to the 
public. 94 On the other hand, regulations, particularly those of 
the technology-forcing kind, tend to stifle the entrepreneurial 
spirit with their heavy-handed approach.95 The complexity of 
problems facing the energy industry calls for a creative, multi-
faceted approach. Regulations, in some instances, are neces-
sary to spur technological innovation, and in others to prevent, 
or at least control, abuses. However, regulations alone might 
not suffice either. Thus, balanced market solutions may be 
what are needed. 
Balanced market solutions are important in encouraging 
the entrepreneurial spirit upon which much of the investment 
and innovation depend, while at the same time providing a 
sense of guarantee to the public that if the market fails, the 
government will step in and prevent socially unacceptable con-
sequences from taking place. The RPS is a case in point. The 
issue of unbundling RECs from the underlying energy is no 
different from most environmental issues over the past two 
decades - it revolves around the balancing of regulatory meas-
ures versus market incentives. Finding a workable compro-
mise is the challenge that the CPUC must meet in order to fa-
cilitate further development of renewable generation, particu-
larly Distributed Generation, while protecting consumers from 
fraud and the state from descending into another energy crisis. 
II. DISCUSSION 
The central issue in the REC "ownership" debate currently 
before the CPUC is whether the renewable attribute of the en-
http://mailer.fsu.edu/-jrossil ; But See Alan Ramo California'S Energy Crisis - the 
Perils of Crisis Management and a Challenge to Environmental Justice, 7 Alb. L. Envtl. 
Outlook 1 (2002) Professor Ramo is a known authority in the area of environmental 
law dealing with environmental justice. He is the Environmental Law and Justice 
Clinic Director at Golden Gate University School of Law in San Francisco. See also 
Stephen M. Johnson, Economics, Equity, and the Environment, (Environmental Law 
Institute, 2004) for a comprehensive overview of major economic incentive and market-
based environmental protection programs . 
.. See supra, note 10. 
95 Some environmental regulation, though by no means all of it, is "technology-
forcing," meaning that it does not take into account the cost of implementation thereby 
forcing technology to come forth with quick, albeit expensive, solutions in order to meet 
the strict standards. 
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ergy can be separated, or "unbundled," from the underlying 
physical energy.96 The Discussion focuses on unbundling in re-
gard to renewable DG, while the Proposal primarily addresses 
the broader issue of unbundling in the context of renewable 
generation in general, and concludes that while Investor 
Owned Utilities and renewable energy entrepreneurs need to 
be given sufficient incentives, the benefits of a REC trading 
program need to be felt by all Californians equally. SB 107, 
which incorporates such balancing efforts, should therefore be 
passed. 
A. BUNDLING - THE CENTRAL ISSUE 
Theoretically, the "renewable attribute" of energy can be 
separated from the underlying energy. Renewable Distributed 
Generators could sell this attribute in the fonn of RECs sepa-
rately from the underlying energy, however, it is important 
first to examine the multitude of implications such unbundling 
would have for California ratepayers and the environment. 
This section will first layout the arguments of the renew-
able DG industry, the utilities, and environmental groups in 
regard to REC ownership as they pertain to the issue of bun-
dling RECs.97 Then it will juxtapose two powerful opposing ar-
guments - the argument of TURN, a non-profit ratepayer ad-
vocate organization, and of Mr. Beach, the owner of a small 
residential photovoltaic system and industry consultant. 
1. The REC Ownership Debate 
The DG industry argues outright that RECs are "distinct 
and separate property" because it wants to maximize the re-
turn on its investment by selling the RECs. 98 The utilities, on 
96 See supra, note 32. 
97 The arguments were presented as comments and reply comments to CPUC 
regarding Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation 
of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program . 
.. See Response of the California Solar Energy Industries Association to the 
Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distrib-
uted Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program, Response of 
the Vote Solar Initiative to the Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Com-
ments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard Program, at 3., Central California Power, Comments to Responses, Adminis-
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the other hand, argue that if the DG system owners are able to 
separate the renewable attribute from the underlying energy, 
they receive a windfall.99 The utilities contend that most of the 
renewable DG facility owners receive ratepayer-sponsored sub-
sidies to install the generating system.100 This subsidy can be 
as high as fifty percent of the cost.IOI Furthermore, the utilities 
note that renewable DG owners interconnect with the utilities 
at no extra charge, to which other, non-renewable Distributed 
Generators are subject.lo2 Then, as a result of net-metering, 
renewable Distributed Generators are able to significantly re-
duce their energy bill. loa Next, instead of having the renewable 
attribute automatically attach to the renewable energy that the 
utility "buys" through the net-metering program, the utility 
actually has to buy these RECs on the market separately.lo, 
Thus, the renewable DG facility owners are receiving three 
separate sources of revenue from their system, which, while an 
incentive for them, may serve as a disincentive for the utilities. 
This in turn may cripple the entire program, a program aimed 
at stimulating the growth of the renewable energy industry.lOs 
The utilities, on the other hand, are silent on the issue of 
unbundling per se.106 It is their position, however, that RECs 
associated with energy produced by renewable Distributed 
Generators, which were subsidized by their ratepayers, ought 
to be counted toward the utilities' RPS compliance. lo, Thus, the 
utilities are arguing that RECs should travel with the energy, 
trative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed 
Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program, at 3., and 
Reply Comments of R. Thomas Beach on the Ownership of Renewable Energy Credits 
from Renewable Distributed Generation Facilities, at 3-4. 
99 See opening comments ofPG&E, p.9; 
100 [d. at 6. 
101 [d. 
102 CA PUB UTIL § 2827(g) 
103 PGE Opening Comments at 8. 
104 [d. 
"" See Comments of TURN and GPI 
106 See Comments of Pacific Gas and Electric Company Regarding Administrative 
Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation 
Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program, Reply Comments of Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company Regarding Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting 
Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard Program., and Comments of San Diego Gas & Electric Company on 
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i.e., that they should remain bundled. On the other hand, RPS-
compliant utilities may, in the future, want to be able to turn 
around and sell those RECs, unbundled from the underlying 
energy, to RPS non-compliant, or less compliant retail sellers. 
This may be the reason they remain silent on the unbundling 
issue per se. 108 
The Union of Concerned Scientists, an independent non-
profit alliance of citizens and scientists, does not express its 
opinion on the bundling issue, but merely advises the CPUC to 
"provide immediate guidance on whether RECs can be unbun-
dled, and [to] establish rules for REC trading in the next phase 
of this proceeding.'''o, The Green Power Institute (hereinafter 
"GPI"), while encouraging the CPUC and California Energy 
Commission to "continue pursuing the development of an effec-
tive and robust REC trading system," does not explicitly ad-
dress the issue of unbundling, though it can be inferred that it 
favors unbundling, judging from the way it describes, and re-
lates to the REC trading program. 110 The main concern of GPI, 
however, is fairness in the sense that "a future REC trading 
system might very well not count the renewable energy that is 
generated and used on the customer side of the meter towards 
any provider's total retail sales, thus over-counting the contri-
bution of Distributed Generation RECs in comparison with 
grid-distributed RECs.'''" GPI therefore argues that "if the cus-
tomer side of the meter DG renewable energy is counted to-
wards a utility's RPS obligation, then the corresponding 
amount of energy should be added to the utility's sales pool in 
order to avoid over crediting the REC contribution to the util-
ity's energy supply mix.""2 
108 [d. 
109 Reply Comments of the Union of Concerned Scientists Regarding Administra-
tive Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed Genera-
tion Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program. 
110 Reply Comments of the Green Power Institute Regarding Administrative Law 
Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation Re-
sources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program. GPI is a program of the Pacific 
Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security, p. 4 
111 [d. at 3. 
112 [d. The RPS goal of the utilities is 20% of all retail electricity sales to derive 
from renewable sources. Thus GPI is arguing that the DG facilities by supplying extra 
energy to the grid, and even if using all of it themselves, are thereby reducing the util-
ity retail sales volume of electricity, thus effectively already generating savings to the 
utility. The DG facility owner should receive some type of recognition for this, such as 
having all these megawatts of electricity going back and forth between the DG facilities 
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2. TURN us. Mr. Beach 
The polarized arguments in the REC ownership proceeding 
are espoused by The Utility Reform Network (hereinafter 
"TURN"), a non-profit ratepayer representative organization, 
and Mr. Beach, an industry consultant and expert witness who 
provides testimony on behalf of Qualifying Facilities interests 
and large industrial electric customers who is also the owner of 
a small residential photovoltaic system.1l3 They stand at two 
opposing ends. TURN focuses on net-metering as the main 
analytical framework for determining what happens with the 
RECs, maintaining they ought to travel with the net-metered 
energy.ll' Mr. Beach, on the other hand, adamantly rejects 
TURN's net-metering proposal, and instead focuses on the fact 
that 
renewable DG removes loads from the [utilities'] grids, and 
thus reduces the amount of renewable power or RECs that 
the [utility] must buy to meet their 20% RPS goals .... that the 
benefits of the renewable peaking generation from [small 
residential] solar panels [are] .. .likely to be far more valuable 
per megawatt-hour than a REC .... [and that since he will] 
bear 100% of the risks of producing RECs, [he has] an equita-
ble claim on 100% of their ongoing value.1I6 
In short, Mr. Beach believes RECs to be a distinct property, 
separate from the underlying energy, which he is entitled to 
sell to whomever he wants for the following reasons: (1) net-
metering is not as generous to him as TURN makes it out to be, 
(2) he bears all the risk associated with maintaining his photo-
voltaic system, and (3) if the utility were to receive his RECs, 
he could remove his system from the grid, buy a battery with 
and the utility properly accounted for in order to avoid double counting on either side. 
This is an important point that most parties raise in one way or another. 
113 See Opening Comments of The Utility Reform Network of the Ownership and 
Disposition of Renewable Energy Credits Produced by Distributed Generation Facili-
ties, September 16, 2004; and Reply Comments of R. Thomas Beach on the Ownership 
of Renewable Energy Credits from Renewable Distributed Generation Facilities, Sep-
tember 30, 2004 
11. Opening Comments of The Utility Reform Network of the Ownership and 
Disposition of Renewable Energy Credits Produced by Distributed Generation Facili-
ties, September 16, 2004. 
115 Reply Comments of R. Thomas Beach on the Ownership of Renewable Energy 
Credits from Renewable Distributed Generation Facilities, at 3-4., September 30, 2004 
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the proceeds of the REC sale, and thus not contribute to peak 
shaving, which is, as Mr. Beach claims, one of the most impor-
tant benefits of the renewable DG systems.l16 
B. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNBUNDLING FOR RENEWABLE 
DISTRIBUTED GENERATORS 
Perhaps net-metering does not proportionally offer the 
same amount of benefit to the DG facility owner as it does to 
the utility; however, beside weighing each side's economic 
benefits there are also significant legal implications underlying 
the net-metering relationship. A determination must be made 
regarding whether the renewable Distributed Generators 
would still qualify for special tariffs under the net-metering 
program if they sold energy to the utility, but withheld the re-
newable attributes of the energy and sold those in the form of 
RECs to a third party. The renewable energy, stripped of its 
"renewable" attribute is in essence no longer renewable. The 
net-metering program, however, was designed specifically to 
promote renewable Distributed Generators, i.e., Distributed 
Generators that generate electricity from non-polluting renew-
able sources, primarily solar and wind. 117 Thus, if the DG facili-
ties were to unbundle the renewable attributes and sell only 
the underlying energy to the utility, stripped of its renewable 
attribute, they would no longer be honoring the net-metering 
terms, because the utility would no longer be getting "renew-
able energy" for its favorable tariffs and waivers of interconnec-
tion fees. Instead it would just be getting "energy," which was 
not the legislative intent behind Section 2827.118 
In October 2003, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (hereinafter "FERC") ruled on a similar state of affairs. 119 
116 "Peak shaving" is a set of creative methods of meeting the ever increasing 
energy demand during peak hours. photovoltaic Distributed Generators, for example, 
generate extra capacity in the middle of the day when demand is peaking. If they are 
interconnected with the grid, utilities can supply other customers who need extra en-
ergy with the photovoltaic generated electricity during peak hours without having to 
make costly investments in capacity building infrastructure. 
117 CA PUB UTIL § 2827 
lIB CA PUB UTIL § 2827 (a) "The Legislature fmds and declares that a program 
to provide net energy metering for eligible customer-generators is one way to encourage 
substantial private investment in renewable energy resources ... " 
119 Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Order, issued October 1, 2003, Docket 
No. EL03-133-000, American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay 
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FERC had decided in favor of renewable QFS.120 It ruled that 
RECs associated with the generation of renewable energy from 
those facilities were not automatically transferred to the utili-
ties with which the QFs had entered into long term contracts 
under PURPA, unless specified to the contrary in the con-
tract. 121 FERC held that RECs are a creation of state law and 
that ownership rights to RECs under Qualifying Facilities con-
tracts are therefore to be addressed by states pursuant to their 
own statutes. 122 Similarly to the issue before the CPUC, the 
FERC case involved utilities and non-utility generators under a 
statutorily guided contract.123 However, "the avoided cost that a 
utility pays a QF does not depend on the type of QF, i.e., 
whether it is a fossil-fuel-cogeneration facility or a renewable-
energy small power production facility. ",2. What can be logi-
cally inferred is that the utility is paying merely for energy, not 
for a specific quality associated with that energy, which is ex-
actly what FERC decided. 125 In contrast, the net-metering tariff 
arrangements between the utilities and the renewable Distrib-
uted Generators are specifically based on the renewable attrib-
ute of the energy generated by the Distributed Generation sys-
tems.126 Thus, it can be inferred that since the tariff terms are 
specifically based on the energy having been generated from 
renewable sources, the renewable DG facility owners, by agree-
ing to the tariff, agree to automatically transfer RECs to the 
utilities. 
At first glance at the controversy surrounding the CPUC 
Rulemaking on Distributed-Generation Renewable-Energy-
Power Corporation, and Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. See also supra, pp. 9-11, for an 
explanation on what QFs are and how they came into existence. 
120 [d. 
121 "We will grant Petitioners' request for declaratory order, to the extent that the 
petition asks that the Commission declare that the Commission's avoided cost regula-
tions did not contemplate the existence of RECs and that the avoided cost rates for 
capacity and energy sold under contracts entered into pursuant to PURPA do not con-
vey the RECs, in the absence of an express contractual provision." [d. at 4. 
122 [d. at 6. 
123 In the case of QFs, their contract with the utilities is guided by PURPA of 
1978, and the net-metering contracts with renewable DG facilities are guided by SB 
1078 provisions for the Renewable Portfolio Standard. 
124 "Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Order," issued October 1, 2003, 
Docket No. EL03-133-000, American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Mon-
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Certificate ownership, one is struck by the unfairness and lack 
of logic and precedent in allowing ownership of a certain aspect 
of property to be conveyed to those who subsidized part of the 
property. 127 However, if the problem is presented in terms of 
net-metering, rather than in terms of subsidies per se, a new 
picture emerges. TURN's comments are based on the terms 
and conditions associated with the net-metering tariff.12S It can 
hardly be said that TURN is known to sympathize with the 
utilities, so the fact that it is taking the same position as the 
utilities (PG&E particularly) is worth examining. 
TURN and GPI approach this issue out of concern for the 
ratepayers and the environment. 129 The utilities have a lot to 
gain but even more to lose. Significantly, if the utilities lose, 
everyone will lose this particular battle. Namely, as PG&E 
poignantly expressed in its answer to a question in Judge Al-
len's questionnaire, the utilities need incentives to participate 
in these public goods programs. 130 While required to provide 
net-metering by law, the utilities can nonetheless make the 
process so burdensome that in effect they would discourage 
renewable DG.'31 On the other hand, the renewable DG facility 
owners could go the other extreme and disconnect from the grid 
altogether, thereby not contributing to the overall efficiency of 
127 See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the California Renewables 
Portfolio Standard Program - Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Com· 
ments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewables Portfo· 
lio Standard Program, Rulemaking 04-04-026 (California Public Utilities Commission, 
Sept. 1, 2004) available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIRULINGS/39482.htm(last visited, Feb 21, 2005) 
128 See TURN's Opening Comments. 
129 Green Power Initiative is a program of the Pacific Institute for Studies in 
Development, Environment and Security; see GPI's Reply Comments. 
130 See PG&E's opening comments, reply to Question 6, p. 12: "If utilities are not 
permitted to recover the cost of buying RECs from renewable DG projects, they will not 
buy them." 
131 GPI stressed the need to give the utilities incentives for participating in the 
program: "The GPI's position is that the RECs associated with customer-side-of-the-
meter energy that has been supported by state renewable energy programs can be 
counted toward the RPS requirement of the utility to which the generator is intercon-
nected, as long as the associated energy is also added to the utility's total retail sales. 
This would not provide an additional revenue source for the DG generator, as desired 
by many DG advocates, but it would provide an incentive to the interconnecting utility 
to facilitate the transaction, and that might very well be worth more than the ultimate 
value of the RECs." GPl's Reply Comments, p. 4. 
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the grid via peak shaving.132 The solution must lie somewhere 
in the middle. If the renewable energy incentives are to work, 
the CPUC must find a balance that is fair and just for all the 
stakeholders. 
C. NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
On March 7, 2005 ALJ Allen issued a Draft Decision on 
the matter, "Opinion Clarifying Participation of Renewable 
Distributed Generation in the Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Program.'''S3 Far from clarifying anything, the decision holds 
that "the owner of the renewable DG facilities owns the RECs 
associated with the generation of electricity from those facili-
ties, [that] those RECs may be used to satisfy the utilities' RPS 
targets, and the RECs stay bundled with the associated elec-
tricity."'s, 
The only party relatively happy with the Draft Decision is 
Mr. Beach, who states: "With this one change, I recommend 
that the full Commission adopt ALJ Allen's well crafted 
P[roposed] D[ecision.]",35 Meanwhile TURN and PG&E vocifer-
ously criticize the Draft Decision as "taking a schizophrenic 
approach to this proposal" and as being "profoundly flawed. ms6 
In TURN's words: 
[T]he PD fails to provide clarity on the only contested issue 
that truly matters - how the RECs from a renewable DG unit 
will be counted under the RPS program. While the PD finds 
that RPS-eligible RECs must remain bundled with physical 
electricity and that such RECs can be used to satisfY RPS tar-
gets, it fails to offer any guidance on the conditions under 
132 As Mr. Beach pointed out in his Reply Comments on p.9, however, then they 
would not be eligible for any net-metering benefits, and would most likely jeopardize 
other state subsidies. 
133 See supra notes 4, 32,36 
134 [d. at 2. 
135 See Opening Comments of R. Thomas Beach on the Proposed Decision of ALJ 
Allen on the Ownership of Renewable Energy Credits from Renewable Distributed 
Generation Facilities, Mar 28, 2005, p.3. 
136 See Opening Comments of The Utility Reform Network of the Proposed Deci-
sion of ALJ Allen on the Ownership and Disposition of Renewable Energy Credits 
Produced by Distributed Generation Facilities, Mar 28, 2005, p. 4; Comments of Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) on the Draft Decision of ALJ Allen Clarifying Par-
ticipation of Renewable Distributed Generation in the Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Program, Mar 28, 2005, p.l3. 
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which RECs are actually transferred to the relevant Investor-
Owned Utility.137 
PG&E protests ALJ Allen's conclusion that "if a facility 
does not participate in the RPS program, then its output can-
not be counted for RPS purposes," stating that such a conclu-
sion "is expressly contrary to the existing RPS statute, which 
allows the utilities to count toward the RPS goal any energy 
purchased from a renewable source, whether or not the energy 
was purchased 'under a standard RPS contract.'",38 Further, 
PG&E claims that the CPUC, by not quantifying "the exact 
amount of benefits the subsidies are paying for ... it will give all 
the attributes of renewable DG to the DG owner" thereby mak-
ing the ratepayer pay twice for the renewable attribute.139 
PG&E agrees that the energy produced by the DG unit can be 
added to the utility's total retail sales in calculating RPS com-
pliance, to avoid double counting, however, only if it is deliv-
ered to the grid under the net metering tariff. 140 
It remains to be seen what the final decision will hold. The 
CPUC must take a more balanced approach than the one es-
poused in the Draft Decision, if the RPS program is to be a suc-
cess. 
III. PROPOSAL 
Unbundling of RECs may harm California's disadvantaged 
communities. The potential for harm requires that affected 
community representatives have meaningful participation in 
the CPUC's regulatory process and necessitates consideration 
of environmental justice as part of the decision-making process. 
SB 107 seeks to strengthen California's commitment to envi-
ronmental justice while shifting the energy paradigm, com-
mensurate with the needs of our times and should therefore be 
supported by the California legislature and, this time around, 
by the Governor. 141 The RPS program contains provisions for 
direct utilities to give preference to any renewable energy pro-
ject bid that provides benefits to low-income and minority 
137 TURN Opening Comments, p.l. 
138 See supra, PG&E's Comments, p.2. 
139 [d. 
140 [d. 
141 See supra, note 39. 
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communities, confirming the will of the people of California 
through their democratically elected legislature to make the 
RPS program environmentally just.142 Additionally, the current 
law ought to include renewable energy project selection criteria 
based on the relative impact of environmental benefits on low 
income and minority communities. 
A. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
UNBUNDLING RECS 
1. What is Environmental Justice? 
Environmental justice is a relatively new political and so-
cial movement that addresses the inequitable distribution of 
environmental harms by making sure affected communities 
have a meaningful voice in the process of environmental deci-
sion-making.143 It has evolved as a legal doctrine since its in-
ception with President Clinton's Executive Order 12898 of Feb-
ruary 11, 1994.144 Executive Order 12898 mandates "each Fed-
eral agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of 
its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, dis-
proportionately high and adverse human health or environ-
mental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minor-
ity populations and low-income populations in the United 
States .... "145 Even though the language of the order is rather 
vague and is binding only on Federal agencies, its promulga-
tion was a big success for environmental justice activists. In 
response to these federal initiatives, California soon followed 
with its own environmental justice statute by adopting a Cali-
fornia environmental justice policy on October 6, 1999.146 
With the growing popularity of market-based approaches 
to resolving environmental problems, environmental justice 
issues are also becoming more acute. As economic theory re-
volves around the concept of efficiency, by its very nature it is 
142 See CA PUB RES § 25743 (b)(6). 
143 Rechtschaffen, supra note 23, at 96-98 
144 See Alan Ramo, Albany Law Environmental Outlook Jrnl. Vol 7, 2002, Issues 1 
and 2, p. 12 (2002) 
". Executive Order 12898 - Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in 
Minority Populations and Low-income Populations, February 11, 1994, Section l-lOI. 
Agency Responsibilities 
146 Ramo, supra note 144, at 13. 
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not suitable for taking issues of justice into account. Under 
classic economic theory, a pollution credits program, for exam-
ple, operates on the premise of efficiency when it shifts pollu-
tion to low income communities or communities of color. 147 Fur-
thermore, such "efficiency" is deemed highly desirable because 
resources are allocated where the willingness and ability to pay 
for them are higher. 148 Grass roots environmental justice activ-
ism, on the other hand, coupled with law has had numerous 
successes in empowering disaffected communities and further-
ing their interests.149 
2. An Example of Market Failure in Pollution Credits 
Trading 
Even those people leaning toward market-based regulatory 
mechanisms have acknowledged the inadequacy of pollution 
credits trading for dealing with most environmental prob-
lems. 15o Two of the most prominent reasons cited are the poten-
tial for creating local toxic hot spots, as well as administrative 
difficulties that present themselves in monitoring the success 
of such programs. lSI 
Pollution credits trading is one of a number of Economic 
Incentive Systems (hereinafter "EIS").152 In contrast to tradi-
tional regulatory command-and-control methods, which estab-
lish how much pollution each actor can generate, EIS establish 
a price for each unit of pollution but leave the level of pollution 
up to the actors to determine.163 The main rationale for EIS is 
their comparative cost efficiency and flexibility.164 If used for a 
narrow environmental purpose for which the particular eco-
147 See Stephen M. Johnson, 56 Wash, & Lee L. Rev. 111, 118-119 (1999) 
1<" [d. 
149 Debate exists among environmental justice activists whether lawyers are 
doing more harm by potentially making affected communities more dependent on the 
system instead of changing it. There is, nonetheless, a movement among environ-
mental justice lawyers to use creativity to emphasize empowerment of these communi-
ties over classic litigation. See Luke Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental 
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 Ecology Law Quarterly 619 
(1992). 
150 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 
Cap.U.L.Rev.21, 22 (2001) 
151 [d. 
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nomic instrument is well suited, EIS can be very meaningful; 
however, sometimes in the process there is not enough room for 
public participation and broader ethical and collective values 
may end up ignored. 155 
On the other hand, one can ''build a variety of hybrid sys-
tems of regulation, combining elements of both the command 
and EIS approaches ... [flor example, command regulation could 
require a minimum level of control by each source, while taxes 
or fees could be imposed or a tradable quota system established 
for remaining dischargers.",56 The RPS program, as envisioned 
by SB 107 amendments, also seeks to establish such a hybrid 
system.157 For example, SB 107 seeks to amend Section 399.15 
of the Public Utilities Code, inter alia, by adding subsection (g), 
which would require the CPUC to "establish rules that author-
ize the use of renewable energy credits to satisfy annual pro-
curement targets," as under current law it is debatable 
whether the commission may do SO.'56 These rules are to con-
tain certain restrictions, however. One of the proposed restric-
tions is the limitation of the quantity of the RECs that can be 
procured unbundled from electricity generation to meet the 
retailer's annual procurement targets. '5" 
Pollution trading programs, if not carefully devised, can be 
more damaging than helpful. The Los Angeles Regional Clean 
Air Incentives Market (hereinafter "RECLAIM"), for example, 
has received mixed reviews even from EIS proponents, while it 
is under severe attack from environmental groupS.'60 
RECLAIM, designed to curb Los Angeles's persisting ozone 
problems, created the first mandatory market in nitrogen oxide 
and sulfur oxide emissions, precursors to ozone. 161 Facilities 
that emit four tons a year of either pollutant must participate 
155 [d. at 96. 
156 [d. at 99. 
I.' See generally SB 107 (Ca. 2005) 
158 SB107, amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.15 by adding (g)(3) (Ca. 2005). 
159 [d. 
160 "RECLAIM has achieved a mixed record of success." Stewart, supra note145, 
at 107. On July 23, 1997, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) filed an ad-
ministrative complaint with the EPA against the Southern California Air Quality 
Management District (SCAQMD) and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) 
under title Vl of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Chinn, infra note 155, at 97-98. 
161 Lily N. Chinn, Comment, Can the Market Be Fair and Efficient? An Environ-
mental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 Ecology L.Q. 80, 89-90 (1999) 
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in the market. 162 They are then allocated emission permits 
based on a combination of historical activity levels and applica-
ble required emission controls.l63 Since Los Angeles is not meet-
ing national ambient air quality standards, the allowable pollu-
tion amount for participants decreases annually. 164 
The goal of using the decreasing cap is to significantly re-
duce emission levels of the two pollutants. 165 Instead of impos-
ing the same set of goals and methods for each facility, this 
market-based approach allows each facility to tailor its own 
most cost effective method for reducing emission standards. ISS 
Thus, annual savings relative to the command and control ap-
proach were projected at an average of $57.2 million.ls7 Despite 
numerous technical problems, and in spite of environmental 
injustice claims, some Econmic Incentives Systems proponents 
state that "RECLAIM has achieved significant pollution reduc-
tions at compliance costs below that they would have been un-
der an equivalent command regulatory system.m68 Others criti-
cize RECLAIM and other such programs for violation of ambi-
ent standards and creation of toxic "hot spots. ",69 
Communities for a Better Environment (hereinafter 
"CBE"), on the other hand, has heavily criticized the program, 
primarily for allowing the sale of mobile source credits on the 
RECLAIM market.170 Such credits could be obtained by scrap-
ping old, highly polluting cars (mobile sources) under Rule 
1610.171 Thus, heavily polluting stationary sources could buy 
excessively cheap credits, up to a regulated level, generated by 
the scrapping of old cars, instead of installing expensive scrub-
bing systems.172 According to studies conducted by CBE, the 
162 Id. at 90. 
163 Id. 
1 .. Id. at 91. 
1 .. Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Stewart, supra note 148, at 107. 
169 Jonathan Remy Nash and Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Design· 
ing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 Ecology 
L.Q. 569, 609-624 (2001) 
170 Id. at 613. 
171 Id. at 612. 
172 Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los 
Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 Duke Env. L & Pol'y F 231, 247-248 
(1999) 
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program has been plagued by corruption and inadequacies.173 
For example, the cars that were being scrapped were not going 
to remain on the roads much longer.174 Therefore, their scrap-
ping was not going to contribute to actual reduction of emis-
sions. 176 Allegedly, the car scrapping program was also fraught 
with "double-counting" corruption schemes, whereby the en-
gines of "scrapped" cars would be saved and installed in other 
cars, which would also defeat the purpose.176 Nonetheless, the 
main problem CBE had with RECLAIM's inclusion of mobile 
source credits in the program was that the effects of mobile 
sources are distributed fairly evenly across a regulated area, 
while in contrast, industrial polluters can, and in this case 
were, "disproportionately located in minority areas ... of the 
four companies that have purchased most of the emission cred-
its, 'three are located close together' in two communities that 
are heavily populated by Latinos.!!t77 The following paragraph 
by Richard Toshiyuki Drury of CBE best summarizes CBE's 
concerns regarding RECLAIM: 
The reality of pollution trading on the ground has not been as 
rosy as the academics and economists predicted. The experi-
ence in Los Angeles shows that, in economic terms, the emis-
sions trading market has been plagued by market failures 
like any other market. These market failures have created 
pollution hot-spots and have allowed trading fraud and anti-
democratic outcomes. These results occurred in a region with 
vast human and financial capital, including perhaps the larg-
est and most sophisticated air pollution regulatory institution 
in the world. These difficulties came from the oldest trading 
programs ever developed for urban air pollution, but they are 
not unique to pollution trading in Los Angeles. Rather, simi-
lar concerns and variations on the problems encountered in 
Los Angeles are likely to be experienced in any market incen-
tives program that relies on trading in emission reduction 
credits.178 
173 [d. at 258-268. 
'" [d. at 261-262. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. at 26l. 
177 Nash and Revesz, supra note 169, at 613. 
178 See supra note 172 at 269-270 
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B. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE UNBUNDLING OF RECs 
Environmental justice may be an argument in favor of 
keeping RECs bundled, or at the very least, for limiting the 
amount of unbundled RECs that can count toward RPS compli-
ance, particularly the renewable Distributed Generation gen-
erated RECs.'79 At the core of what Environmental Justice ac-
tivists are trying to achieve is the displacement of dirty genera-
tion disproportionately located in poor and minority communi-
ties. The RPS program could help with this goal in several re-
gards: by limiting out-of-state RECs, by requiring physical de-
livery of electricity generated from renewable sources for in-
state REC trading, by limiting RPS-eligible RECs to those that 
remain bundled with the physical energy, and by encouraging 
renewable energy projects in economically depressed rural ar-
eas. 
California has a strong interest in limiting the number of 
out-of-state RECs that can be counted toward RPS compli-
ance. 'SO The current RPS program already contains provisions 
favoring in-state renewable resources and the newly introduced 
SB 107 further reinforces them. lSI Moreover, SB107 contains 
provisions limiting RPS eligibility to new out-of-state renew-
able energy facilities, and requires proof of physical delivery of 
renewable energy into California. ,s2 RECs, in order to be RPS-
eligible, need to meet certain environmental criteria; otherwise 
the program would be meaningless, as the idea behind RECs is 
to stimulate generation of energy from renewable sources. Re-
strictions must also be placed on where generated RECs may 
be purchased if the goals of the RPS program are to be met. 
For example, if California utilities and other electricity retail-
ers could comply with the RPS target by purchasing unlimited 
amounts of cheap wind energy, or RECs associated with such 
energy, from an out-of-state renewable energy generator, they 
could forego supporting in-state renewable sources, which may 
be somewhat more expensive. ,s3 
179 See supra note 10. 




182 See supra, notes 78,79 
183 E.g. solar, biomass, biogas etc. 
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Unrestricted import of renewable energy from out of state 
would not only harm the viability of in-state renewable energy 
programs, but local air quality would not gain the benefits of 
having more in-state energy produced through local renewable 
energy generators.la• The reason for this is that retailers who 
procure their energy from dirty power plants could buy cheap 
unbundled RECs from out of state and meet the current RPS 
procurement goal, but could simultaneously continue to gener-
ate as much local pollution as before. Thus, the environmental 
benefits associated with generating electricity from renewables, 
as opposed to fossil fuels, would go to out-of-state communities 
hosting the renewable energy generation facilities. If Califor-
nia were to find itself in such a scenario, it is highly likely that 
low income communities and communities of color would be 
disproportionately subjected to resultant environmental degra-
dation, as these are the communities in which the old polluting 
power plants are located. la5 
Certain geographic areas, however, do not have much to of-
fer in terms of renewable energy resources, or even if they do, 
transmission of those resources remains a serious problem.la6 
In such limited instances, the unbundling of RECs and imports 
from out of state may be the "least-cost best-fit solution.»!a7 
SB107 recognizes such situations by providing a degree of 
flexibility.laa 
Environmental justice is, of course, part of the larger envi-
ronmental picture of California. Overall environmental degra-
dation could result from unbridled importation of renewable 
energy, or RECs from out of state for the purpose of RPS com-
pliance. Any such environmental degradation is sure to affect 
low income and minority communities to a larger degree than 
the overall population. la9 SB 107 limits the RPS compliance 
eligibility for out-of-state RECs, for RECs generated by new 
facilities, and for requiring physical delivery of renewable en-
184 See supra, pp.4-7. 
185 See supra, note 22. 
lll6 This problem is recognized by SB 107. . SB 107 adding CA PUB UTIL 
§399.14(a)(2)(C)(ii), (Ca. 2005). See also, CEC White Paper, Chapter 4, for geographic 
distribution of renewable resources throughout California. 
187 See CA PUB UTIL §399.14(a)(2)(B). 
188 See supra, note 187. 
189 See supra, note 22. 
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ergy. SBI07 does so in the interest of the California environ-
ment, and should for that reason be supported. 190 
The RPS program must require that physical renewable 
energy be delivered to the grid. If RECs were unbundled, espe-
cially unbundled without any limitations as to the quantity of 
such RECs that can count toward in-state RPS compliance, 
without regard to the quality of renewable energy resources or 
the location where they were created through generation of a 
specified unit of renewable energy, California's environment 
could be seriously jeopardized. According to economic theory of 
efficiency, in an unfettered free market, minority and low-
income communities would most likely be the first to fall victim 
to such environmental degradation.191 
On the DG front, if RECs were to remain bundled with the 
underlying energy, then much of the problem would be elimi-
nated and consumer confidence in the REC trading system 
could be maintained. The CPUC needs to continue requiring 
physical delivery of renewable energy for purposes of satisfying 
RPS obligations. At least the utilities ought to be able to count 
all the net-metered renewable energy toward their RPS com-
pliance. It would remain to be seen what happens with the 
surplus energy, not net-metered. It would also be fair for the 
utilities to compensate renewable DG owners for the energy 
released onto the grid in excess of the net-metered energy.192 In 
any case, if the utility does not purchase the excess energy 
from the renewable DG owner, then RECs associated with that 
energy ought to remain with the DG owner.193 The question is 
whether it is worth investing in complex metering instruments 
to figure out so many details of the transaction.19' 
By the CPUC requiring that only bundled RECs be eligible 
toward RPS compliance, the net-metering arrangements be-
tween renewable Distributed Generators and the utilities 
would maintain their legitimacy. 195 If net-metered renewable 
190 See supra, n. 180. 
19. See supra, note 147. • 
192 Currently any excess energy is practically a gift to the utility .. 
193 See supra pp. 24-27(The argument on net-metering tariffs). 
194 One of the many undertakings in connection with DG, currently before the 
CPUC, is also an effort to remove barriers to effective and unified metering. E.g. Scott 
Tomashefsky (CEC), A Report Submitted on Behalf of Some Rule 21 Working Group 
Members, Potential Topics for Consideration in CPUC DG OIR, June 5, 2003. 
1911 See supra, pp.24-27. 
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DG owners were to unbundle RECs and sell them separately to 
third parties (not the utility they are interconnected with), they 
may lose their net-metering eligibility, and thereby much of the 
financial incentive for investing in the generating infrastruc-
ture in the first place. 196 In an absolute world of complete bun-
dling, however, the renewable DG entrepreneurs might have 
less financial incentive to engage in the program.197 As for the 
financial health of renewable DG owners, the separation of the 
renewable attribute from the underlying energy could poten-
tially give DG owners and developers of large-scale renewable 
facilities more flexibility. However, if they want to sell those 
RECs for purposes of RPS compliance, steps need to be taken to 
prevent double-counting, environmental injustice, and degra-
dation of the Californian environment. SB 107 contains most 
of the necessary REC eligibility restrictions, as does ALJ Al-
len's current draft decision, at least in regard to limiting RPS 
eligibility to bundled RECs.198 
Meanwhile, plentiful creative solutions may already exist 
to combat the problem of environmental injustice. By facilitat-
ing large renewable electricity projects in poor, rural areas, a 
lot could be done to empower local communities. Moreover, 
renewable energy projects selection criteria ought to include 
the relative impact of environmental benefits on low-income 
and minority communities. 
If unbundled without limitations, generation from renew-
able resources could be promoted strictly as a function of mar-
ket efficiency rather than as part of a desperately needed com-
prehensive paradigm shift in energy policy. In the short run, 
renewable energy may not seem the most cost-efficient solution 
to many energy problems. In the long run, however, a new way 
of thinking about energy will have to take place, not only to 
resolve issues of growing energy demand worldwide coupled 
with decreasing fossil fuel reserves, but also the accompanying 
political and social upheavals abroad as well as at home.199 
Government regulations are better suited for implementation 
of long-term policies than markets themselves, as the goal of 
market efficiency is not the best guiding principle in the com-
196 [d. 
1Jl7 See supra, pp.23-24. 
IJl6 See supra, note 180. 
IJl9 The ongoing war in Iraq is merely a harbinger of this trend. 
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plexity of the world we live in today. A hybrid of the two ap-
proaches, such as the RPS program with the proposed quota, 
would bring together the best of both approaches. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is the intent of the legislature, as seen through the exist-
ing RPS program and the pending SB 107, to further stimulate 
renewable energy to the benefit of the entire population of Cali-
fornia. 200 The future renewable energy credits trading program 
may contribute to that goal if carefully implemented, without 
encroaching on the prerogatives of the California RPS. In par-
ticular, unbundled RECs should not be allowed toward RPS 
compliance except in those rare instances when geography pre-
vents a retailer from obtaining renewable energy. SB 107 
takes those instances into consideration.201 Solutions regarding 
the design and eligibility requirements of the future California 
regulated REC trading program ought to be beneficial to all 
California citizens, including low income and minority commu-
nities, and of course, the utility ratepayers. At the same time, 
sufficient incentives must be offered to the investor owned 
utilities as well as the renewable energy entrepreneurs, two 
groups of players with often opposing views that are essential 
for the success of this program. 
As the trend toward reliance on pollution credit trading 
and other market-based approaches to battling pollution 
quickly grows, concerns regarding environmental justice are 
also on the rise. Unfortunately, most of those who approach 
this problem from a market-based vantage point tend to over-
look environmental justice issues.202 That is a serious omission 
but it does not have to be that way, and, it is hoped, will not be 
repeated here. We must exercise caution when designing the 
REC trading program, paying attention to environmental jus-
tice issues, and not sweeping them under the rug in the name 
of "market efficiency." It is imperative that California, being at 
200 See CA PUB UTIL §399.11, and SB 107 amending CA PUB UTIL §399.11 
201 See supra, note 187 
202 "Professors Ackerman and Stewart, early advocates of trading programs, rec-
ognized the 'hot spot' problem more than a decade ago, but defended trading by arguing 
that the existing command-and-control approach does not prevent 'hot spots' either." 
Stephen M. Johnson, Economics, Equity, and the Environment, Environmental Law 
Institute, (Washington D.C., 2004). 
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the forefront of the sustainable energy policy struggle, and 
shaping the way for the rest of the country, finds the right an-
swer in this important matter. 
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